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COMMENTS
MY BROTHER'S KEEPER? THE CRIMINALIZATION OF
NONFEASANCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF DUTY TO
REPORT STATUTES
A seven-year-old girl was sexually assaulted and murdered in the
women's restroom of a Las Vegas casino. The casino security cameras show
two young men entering the restroom behind her. One of the men watched
the other take the girl into a bathroom stall and begin to muffle her screams
with his hand. After two minutes, the observer exited the restroom. The
other young man remained in the restroom with the girl, walking out twenty
minutes later. The little girl never walked out. She had been strangled and
her dead body lay slumped over a toilet in one of the stalls. '
The sexual assault and murder of a little girl is always shocking and out-
rageous. However, this particular case was shocking not only because of the
nature of the attack itself, but because it could have easily been prevented.
The controversy over the inaction of the observer has created a furor of
legislation.' In California, where the victim, assailant, and witness all reside,
a state bill was introduced in December 1998.? AB 37 would make it a mis-
demeanor to fail to report any violent felony or a sexual assault on a child, or
any assault on a child likely to result in serious bodily harm.' In the U.S.
Senate, California Senator Barbara Boxer has co-sponsored legislation
which would force all states to pass laws that require witnesses of child sex-
ual abuse to report the crime to police.5 The "Sherrice Iverson Act" would
require states to enact this legislation within five years or lose their federal
funding for child abuse prevention.6
1. This scenario is based on the facts of the Sherrice Iverson murder, infra.
2. There is pending legislation in the U.S. Congress, California and Nevada in direct re-
sponse to this murder. See State Laws with Regard to "Duty to Assist" in Crime Situation
National Conference of State Legislatures, Dec. 1998 [hereinafter State Laws]; S. 2452, 105
Congress (1998). In addition to the furor of legislation, there has also been a furor at the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley, where the young man who observed the assault is a student.
The public has called for his expulsion, but the University insists it cannot penalize the young
man, as no violation of campus rules has occurred. See Anne-Marie O'Conner, California and
the West Protest Follows Accused Accomplice College: Out of Town Demonstrators Make
Angry Calls for UC Berkeley Officials to Expel David Cash, the Friend of Child-Murder Sus-
pect Jeremy Strohmeyer, L.A. Tmirs, Aug. 27, 1998, at A3.
3. See Bill Requires Reporting of Violent Crimes, S.D. UNION TRIBUNE, Dec. 10, 1998, at
A6.
4. See id.
5. See S. 2452, 105' Congress (1998).
6. See id.
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This comment examines the proposed Federal and California legislation,
and determines that it is unconstitutional to criminalize nonfeasance. Part I
will briefly survey contemporary legal arguments both for and against
"Good Samaritan" legislation. Part II will examine the constitutional issues
raised by the Federal legislation. Part III will address specifically the consti-
tutional questions raised by the proposed California legislation. Part IV will
show the ineffectiveness of the California legislation as applied to the Sher-
rice Iverson murder.
Casino security cameras and statements made by both the killer and his
friend documented the details of the murder. Jeremy Strohmeyer and David
Cash, Jr. had driven with David's father to Las Vegas from their homes near
Los Angeles, California.7 As the night turned to the early hours of the morn-
ing, the young men played video games at the Primadonna Casino.!
A seven-year-old girl, Sherrice Iverson, was also playing in the game
room, while her father gambled in the casino.9 Sherrice, while playing with
another young boy, was throwing wet, wadded paper towels, when an errant
shot hit Jeremy Strohmeyer ° Jeremy turned toward the little girl and began
playfully chasing her." Video security cameras display the two playing
around the game room. 2 Sherrice then ran into the women's restroom and
began to get more wet paper towels to throw at Jeremy. 3
David Cash, Jr., Jeremy's best friend, followed Jeremy into the rest-
room, and watched as they threw paper towels at each other. David then saw
Jeremy pick up the little girl and take her into a toilet stall. 4 David walked
over to the next stall and looked over the door to see what his friend was do-
ing. Jeremy had Sherrice pressed up against the wall with his hand over her
mouth, muffling her screams. 6 Jeremy told Sherrice to shut up or he would
kill her. 7 David maintains that he never saw Strohmeyer actually sexually
molest the girl, 8 but that he tapped Jeremy in the head and gave him a look
as if he should not be doing that.' Jeremy just looked back at him with a
7. See Sixty Minutes: The Bad Samaritan?; David Cash Faces Hostility From Public for
Not Taking Action to Prevent the Rape and Murder of Sherrice Iverson by His Friend Jeremy
Strohneyer (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Sixty Minutes].
8. See id.
9. See id.









18. See Nora Zamichow, Strohmeyer Friend Saw Him Molest Girl, Classmates Say
Crime: David Cash Described Assault in Casino, Teens Tell Authorities, L.A. TIMEs, Sept.
16, 1998, at Al.
19. See Sixty Minutes, supra note 7.
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blank stare and David felt it was time to for him to get out of there."0
Tapes from the video surveillance cameras showed David Cash leaving
the restroom about two minutes after he walked in.2' He waited outside for
over twenty minutes for his best friend, Jeremy.' His best friend walked out,
looked at David Cash and said, "I - I killed her."' The two boys immedi-
ately left. They spent the rest of the night at other casinos, playing slot ma-
chines and riding roller coasters, before returning to California. 4
Jeremy Strohmeyer was arrested and charged with first-degree murder.'
He pled guilty to the crime and received life in prison without the possibility
of parole. 6 In his statement to the court he expressed remorse and blamed his
friend, David, for not stopping the attack.2
David Cash, Jr., has not been charged with any crime.' According to
Nevada prosecutors, he has committed none. Merely witnessing a crime is
not a crime in itself." There is no law against the failure to report a crime in
Nevada." So-called "Good Samaritan" laws have only been enacted in a few
states.
32
Undoubtedly, David Cash was in a position to stop the assault and mur-
der of Sherrice Iverson. He could have pulled his friend off of her or sum-
moned the nearby casino security guards. He could have stopped the attack
with little or no risk to himself. But he chose not to do so. There is no ques-
tion that his decision to remain uninvolved while his friend sexually as-
saulted and eventually murdered a little girl was morally reprehensible, but
prosecuters concede it is not a crime.3 Therefore, the question is whether it
is possible to create a law that would make Cash's behavior criminal without





24. See Sixty Minutes, supra note 7.
25. See John M. Glionna, Strohmeyer Partly Blames Others Courts: Girl's Killer Admits
'monstrous' Deed, But Says Casinos, Internet, Cash Share Responsibility, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
15, 1998, at Al.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Maura Dolan, 'Good Samaritan' Laws Are Hard to Enact, Experts Say Aid: Out-
rage Over Inaction of Strohmeyer Friend Sparks Calls for Bills. But Existing Legislation Has
Limited Success, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at Al.
29. See id.
30. See id; WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. Scotr, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §
6.7 (1986). "In the absence of unique circumstances giving rise to a duty to do so, one does
not become an accomplice by refusing to intervene in the commission of a crime." Id.
31. See LAFAVE & Scorr, JR., supra note 30, § 6.7; Dolan, supra note 28.
32. Currently just seven states require bystanders to report certain crimes; Florida, Mas-
sachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. See State Laws, su-
pra note 2.
33. See Dolan, supra note 28.
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Cash has done little to bolster his case. On a Los Angeles radio pro-
gram, he expressed no remorse for his actions,
"How much am I supposed to-to sit down and cry about this? I mean...
lets be reasonable here. Is my life supposed to halt for- like, for days,
weeks and months on end .... The simple fact remains, I do not know this
little girl. I do not know starving children in Panama."'
When asked if the murder was on his conscience during a national television
broadcast, Cash responded, "No, not to the extent that most people would
want it to be."'35
Cash's lack of remorse has fueled the controversy surrounding his ac-
tions. Surely, any decent human being would stop the molestation and mur-
der of a little girl if it were easily within their power.
Critics of the Nevada prosecution have claimed that there is evidence
that David Cash may have aided the commission of the crime or been an ac-
cessory after the fact.36 They claim that prosecutors made a deal with Cash to
secure his testimony against Strohmeyer.37 Prosecutors, however, maintain
that what Cash did was not a crime, and that even if he had witnessed the en-
tire assault and murder, he could not be charged.38 In order to have convicted
Cash, the state would need some type of "Good Samaritan" statute; criminal
sanctions for failing to rescue a victim that could easily be saved or failure to
report a crime to police.
I. COMMON THEMES IN 'GOOD SAMARITAN' LEGISLATION
Historically, there has never been a legal penalty for failing to come to
the aid of others in the United States. Although several exceptions have been
created for those who have a special relationship with the victim or put the
victim in the perilous situation, we still adhere to the common law doctrine
of nonfeasance; there is no duty to come to the aid of a stranger.39
34. Sixty Minutes, supra note 7.
35. Id.
36. See Zamichow, supra note 18. Friends of Cash claim Cash admitted to watching
Strohmeyer molest the girl with his fingers and then asked Strohmeyer if she was aroused.
The comment may indicate that Cash encouraged the assault and could be prosecuted as an
accomplice.
37. See id; Charles Ashby, The Right to be Apathetic: Iverson Case Raises Questions
About Good Samaritan Laws, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Sept. 2, 1998, at Al (critics argue that
Cash was not prosecuted because he could not be compelled to testify against Strohmeyer if
he were suspected of the crime).
38. See Zamichow, supra note 18. Accomplice liability is dependent on acts which aid,
encourage, assist, or induce the criminal behavior of another. Although physical aid is not
necessary, there must be some encouragement from the observer, "one does not become an
accomplice by refusing to intervene in the commission of a crime." LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra
note 30, at § 6.7.
39. See Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal, 26 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 423, 424 (1985).
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Courts have followed this rule despite the often horrific consequences of
victims left maimed or killed, while bystanders who easily could have inter-
vened, refrained from doing so.' Even though morality might well obligate a
person to come to the rescue of another, no corresponding legal obligation
exists.4
Common law proponents assert that this lack of legal liability for non-
feasance is justified because the actor did not cause the actual harm:s It is
also argued that forced altruism infringes on individual liberty and auton-
omy.43 Questions arise about the feasibility of identifying the individuals
who fail to aid.' A duty to aid others may also lead to an uncertainty about
when to act and create problems of strangers intervening in the affairs of
others."5 Finally, it is argued that a legal duty dilutes, if it does not destroy
entirely, the moral incentive to aid others.'
Modem critics of the general rule argue that there should be a legal duty
to act in cases of "easy rescue."'47 The fact that injuries would be reduced and
lives saved is one justification for this proposed rule.4" Further, the law
would reinforce morality and virtue, rather than dilute it.49 Some critics have
argued individualism is actually furthered by a legal duty to rescue."
The controversy over imposing a general duty to come to the aid of oth-
ers is bolstered whenever a shocking case of failure to aid is brought to the
40. See generally Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316 (1959) (man who dared another man to
jump in a deep water filled coal ditch, then watched him drown); Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn.
299 (1907) (man refused to permit a business guest to spend the night, although it was dark
and the man had taken ill); Union P.R. Co. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649 (1903) (railroad employ-
ees refused to render aid to little boy hit by train).
41. See generally Yania, 397 Pa. at 316; Depue, 100 Minn. at 299; Union P.R. Co, 66
Kan. at 649.
42. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Note, Beyond Good Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An
Individualistic Justification of The General Duty to Rescue, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 252, 267
(1983); John T. Pardun, Note, Good Samaritan Laws: A Global Perspective, 20 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 591, 603 (1998). These authors merely present the argument, but do not
necessarily endorse it.
43. See Lipkin, supra note 42, at 276-77.
44. See id. at 270; Silver, supra note 39, at 433.
45. See Silver, supra note 39, at 431-32.
46. See Saul Levmore, Waiting For Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive
Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 72 VA. L. REv. 879, 889 (1985); A.D. Woo-
zley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 VA. L. REv. 1273, 1292
(1983).
47. Lipkin, supra note 42, at 289-90; Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A
Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1993).
"Easy rescue" would require intervention by a bystander when there is no risk of harm to
himself. Id. at 24-25.
48. See Lipkin, supra note 42, at 289-90.
49. See Anthony D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 798
(1976).
50. See Lipkin, supra note 42, at 293 (arguing that personal autonomy and individualism
are advanced because individuals have a significant self-interest in 'easy rescue' since a legal
duty increases the likelihood that they, themselves, will be rescued if needed.)
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attention of the nation. The Sherrice Iverson murder is a modem example of
a case that has created public debate over the duty to aid strangers. Similarly
in 1997, a wave of controversy surrounded Princess Diana's death when it
was reported that photographers who witnessed the fatal crash stood by and
took pictures, offering no assistance to the injured victims." In 1983 legisla-
tion was enacted in Minnesota, Massachusetts and Rhode Island, when a
young woman was raped in a Massachusetts bar while other patrons looked
on.52 In 1964, a young woman was stabbed to death outside her New York
apartment. Though she cried and screamed for thirty-five minutes, thirty-
eight neighbors who witnessed the crime failed to even summon the police. 3
It was in reaction to this tragedy that Vermont passed its "Good Samaritan
Statute.'
In the legislative wake of the Sherrice Iverson murder, the U.S. Con-
gress will consider forcing every state in the union to enact a "Good Samari-
tan" law or lose federal funding.5 Now is the time to examine carefully not
only the theoretical controversy surrounding such legislation, but also the
constitutional questions it raises.
II. THE PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer has introduced legislation that would re-
quire states to enact laws creating a duty to report child sexual assaults:
To amend the Child Abuse Prevention Act to require States receiving
funds under secton 106 of such Act to have in effect a State law providing
for a criminal penalty on an individual who fails to report witnessing an-
other individual engaging in sexual abuse of a child5 6
Also known as the "Sherrice Iverson Act", this bill would force states to
enact a duty to report statute or lose funding for child abuse prevention. 7
Each state in the union will be pressured to create legislation that is directly
opposed to the traditional common law rule and may be directly violative of
the U.S. Constitution.
The Federal Government has the authority to require states to enact cer-
tain legislation under its spending power, so long as there is a rational rela-
tionship between the conditions imposed and the corresponding federal
51. See Pardun, supra note 42, at 591.
52. See Silver, supra note 39, at 423.
53. See id.
54. VT. STAT ANN. Tit. 12, § 519 (1968). But see Yeager, supra note 47, at 35-38 (while
the statute has been in existence the longest, there is no record of any prosecutions and a sur-
vey of district attorneys indicates the statute is never enforced); Dolan, supra note 28 (Ver-
mont prosecutor of 20 years has no memory of the statute ever being enforced).
55. See S. 2452, 105th Cong. (1998).
56. S. 2452,105th Cong. (1998).
57. See S. 2452, 105th Cong. (1998).
[Vol. 36
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funds." If the legislation meets this test, 9 it places each state in the difficult
position of trying to draft a duty to report statute that does not violate the
U.S. Constitution.
Central to the Bill of Rights is the right to free speech, including the
right not to be compelled to speak.' Duty to report statutes require com-
pelled speech, thus raising serious constitutional questions. The Federal
Government has never had the authority to coerce states into drafting uncon-
stitutional laws."
Ironically, those states that refuse to enact an unconstitutional statute
will lose the very funding that is used to protect children from child abuse.
The Sherrice Iverson Act will have the effect of either, forcing states to in-
fringe on their citizens' constitutional rights or depriving children of funds to
help protect them.
mI. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE PROPOSED CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATION.
In California, a bill has already been introduced which would require
citizens to report certain crimes.' On December 7, 1998, Assembly Member
Tom Torlakson introduced a bill, which would criminalize failure to report
the commission of a violent felony or an assault on a child;
SECTION 1. Section 152 is added to the Penal Code, to read:
152. (a) Any person who reasonably believes that he or she has observed
the commission of any of the following offenses shall notify a peace offi-
cer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of
Part 2, as soon as reasonably possible:
A violent felony, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5,63 or an at-
58. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (conditions of federal grants are le-
gitimate if related to a federal interest in a particular national program; there was a rational
relationship between state highway funds and the minimum legal drinking age).
59. There appears to be a rational relationship between federal funding for child abuse
prevention and a law that is created to protect children from sexual assaults.
60. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding violation of First Amendment
where state compelled citizen to display state motto on license plate); Riley v. National Fed'n
of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (holding government mandated speech,
where speaker would not otherwise speak, violates First Amendment); Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (holding one im-
portant aspect of free speech is the right of the speaker to decide what not to say); Glickman
v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (finding generic advertising paid for by
agricultural growers under the California Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act is not com-
pelled speech).
61. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 209; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (holding that
Congress can not use its spending power as a means to an unconstitutional end).
62. See AB 37, Assembly (Cal. 1998).
63. This section lists violent felonies as: murder, voluntary manslaughter, mayhem, rape,
sodomy by force, oral copulation by force, lewd acts on a child, any felony punishable by life
1999]
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tempt to commit a violent felony. A violation of section 288, or an attempt
to violate Section 288.64
Any assault of a child that appears reasonably likely to cause substantial
bodily harm to the child. This section shall not be construed to affect
privileged relationships as provided by law.
(c) The duty to notify a peace officer imposed pursuant to subdivision (a)
is satisfied if the notification or an attempt to provide notice by telephone
or any other means is made as soon as reasonably possible. Failure to no-
tify as required pursuant to subdivision (a) is a misdemeanor.
This section shall not apply when the person has a reasonable belief that
giving notice, as required by subdivision (a), would place that person or
another family or household member in danger of immediate physical
harm.65
The statute would make it a misdemeanor for an eye-witness of a vio-
lent felony, a sexual assault on a child, or any assault on a child likely to lead
to serious harm, to refrain from contacting the authorities as soon as rea-
sonably possible.' This legislation was proposed in direct response to the
murder of Sherrice Iverson.' Although the Federal bill specifically states
that its goal is to protect children,' the proposed California statute does not
state its purpose. Tom Torlakson has stated that the law will serve to remind
citizens of their duty to be good Samaritans.' However, the law acts as more
than a mere reminder; it criminally penalizes all who fail to act.
There may, in fact, be legitimate interests in enacting a duty to report
violations of the law. The law may require people to report to authorities as
soon as possible, so that police may intervene before the attack goes any fur-
ther. The law may seek to alert authorities to crimes, so that the police can
capture the perpetrator while the leads are still "hot." In either case, the law
may run afoul of several constitutional principles, including procedural due
process, the First Amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, sub-
stantive due process, and the Equal Protection Clause.
imprisonment or death, any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily harm on any
person other than an accomplice, any robbery in an inhabited home or vessel, arson, at-
tempted murder, kidnapping, car-jacking, and any robbery in the first degree. CAL PENAL
CODE § 667.5 (West 1998).
64. This section makes it a crime to commit a lewd act on a child under 14. The penalties
are stiffer than for sex crimes against adults. CAL PENAL CODE § 288.
65. AB 37, Assembly (Cal. 1998).
66. See AB 37, Assembly (Cal. 1998).
67. See Chuck Squatriglia, Bill Would Require Crime Report, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,
Dec. 9, 1998, at Al.
68. See S. 2452, 105th Cong. (1998).
69. See Squatriglia, supra note 67, at Al.
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A. Procedural Due Process
Inherent in our Constitution is the right to due process of law." Due
process protects citizens from arbitrary enforcement of criminal laws.7 A
statute is invalid if it does not give fair notice as to what behavior constitutes
a crime or if it has the potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment.72 As a matter of due process, a law is void if it is so vague that "per-
sons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and dif-
fer as to its application."73
It is possible that this California legislation will not provide fair notice
to its citizens. This is because those citizens may be unaware that they are
violating the law. Under the first prong of the analysis it is both ambiguous
and vague. Section l(a) requires individuals to report to police, as soon as
reasonably possible, a felony or attempt to commit a felony that they rea-
sonably believe they have witnessed.'4 While the violent felonies are enu-
merated in Section 677.5 of the penal code, 5 it may not always be possible
to determine whether or not a crime is actually being committed. If a witness
sees two people struggling in the back seat of a car, she may be witnessing a
rape, or an attempted rape. On the other hand, the witness may be observing
a consensual act. It is unclear whether the witness must continue observing
to determine whether a crime has occurred.
Even though the "reasonably believes" language is meant to clear up the
ambiguity, the word "reasonable" indicates that it is an objective test.
Whether one subjectively believes he is witnessing a crime is not at issue. A
jury may infer that a reasonable person in a similar situation would have be-
lieved a crime was in progress, and find the person who failed to report
guilty, even if the person subjectively believed that no crime was taking
place.
A witness may be required to take into consideration the prospect of af-
firmative defenses. Suppose a witness observes a man shooting another man,
but reasonably believes that the act was in self-defense.76 Logic would dic-
tate that no report is necessary because the witness does not believe a crime
has occurred. However, it remains unclear what the statute intends with re-
gard to such situations.
The prospect of reporting 'attempts' raises further questions. First year
70. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 (1983) (Fourteenth Amendment creates a
due process right applicable to the states.)
71. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 354.
72. See id. at 357-58; Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752 (1974).
73. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 264 (1997).
74. See AB 37, Assembly (Cal. 1998).
75. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5 (West 1998).
76. See LAFAVE & Scor JR., supra note 30, § 5.7. Acting in self-defense is a complete
defense to crimes against the person, so that the person acting in self-defense is not guilty of
any crime. See id.; People v. Toledo, 193 P.2d 953 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948) (self-defense need
not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
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law students have struggled heavily with issues of attempt. There is a fine
line between mere preparation to commit a crime and an actual attempt.7 A
witness to an act that borders on that line would have a difficult time deter-
mining whether a report to police is in fact required.
Section 1 (a)(3) raises some of the more serious questions. It requires a
witness to report "any assault on a child that appears reasonably likely to
cause serious bodily injury to the child."78 A witness may determine that a
red mark, a welt, or a bruise constitutes serious bodily injury. Certainly bro-
ken bones, internal injuries and death would qualify, but a witness may not
know where to draw the line. A witness would not be on notice when a re-
port is required in those situations.
Further, the statute does not define a child. A child may be any person
under the age of eighteen, perhaps under the age of fourteen or even twelve.
The statute is silent as to age. The statute is simply too ambiguous for a wit-
ness to know when they are committing a crime.
Section (b) specifies that the statute does not affect privileged relation-
ships. 9 It does not state whether those privileges are evidentiary or common-
law privileges. For instance, a married individual who witnesses her husband
assault a child would not have a duty to report the crime under the eviden-
tiary privilege."0 However, at common law, the wife, as mother to the child,
would be required to intervene on behalf of her child.8' Further, at common
law, a father is privileged to discipline his child.82 A witness who observes
an assault by a parent may not have a duty to report if the assault falls within
the common law privilege. It is entirely unclear what type of privileged rela-
tionships the statute means to exclude.
Section (e) relieves a witness of the obligation to give notice when the
person has a reasonable belief that she or a family member would be in dan-
ger of immediate physical harm.83 This section seems to make the statute
reasonable by addressing the concerns of bystanders who fear for their own
safety. The problem is the "immediate" language. It is unclear when the fear
of harm is no longer immediate. Certainly an individual who is very close to
a violent attack may be in fear of immediate harm. However, witnesses are
often farther away. Suppose a witness sees a drive-by shooting from her
77. See Linda P. Bell, R.N., Comment, Criminally Attempting the Medically Improb-
able, T. MARSHALL L. REv. 243, 251-52 (Spring, 1995). "Precisely what type of act is re-
quired (for an attempt) is not made very clear by ... courts and legislatures ... more than an
act of mere preparation must occur." LAFAvE & Scorr JR., supra note 30, § 6.2.
78. AB 37, Assembly (Cal. 1998).
79. See AB 37, Assembly (Cal. 1998).
80. See CAL EvIn. CODE § 972 (a spouse is privileged from testifying against his/her
spouse in criminal proceedings).
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1993) (there is a special relationship
between parent and child, thus a parent already has an affirmative duty to assist/rescue their
child).
82. See id. § 147 (a parent is privileged to discipline his/her child).
83. See AB 37, Assembly (Cal. 1998).
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kitchen window. Suppose that person also knows that the perpetrator has
threatened to kill anyone who gives any information about his illegal activity
to the police. In fact, the drive-by shooting was in retaliation for the victim's
alleged 'squealing.' The witness is justified in fearing harm to herself or her
family. It is entirely unclear whether the threat of violence is the type of
harm that exempts one from the reporting requirements of the statute. It is
not immediate, because the perpetrator is not close in proximity. The witness
would not know whether he is committing a crime by failing to report. The
ambiguity creates a fair notice problem.
The statute also fails under the second prong of the vagueness doctrine
as there is a great potential for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'
Witnesses who fail to come forward initially may be reluctant to come for-
ward later for fear of prosecution. While those who do come forward may be
threatened with prosecution unless they agree to testify against the perpetra-
tor of the crime. In states that already have a duty to report statute, there is
evidence that the statute is enforced primarily in cases where the witness has
some possible involvement in the crime.' The individual is prosecuted under
the misdemeanor duty to report statute because there is a lack of sufficient
evidence for a felony conviction, or the prosecutors feel a felony conviction
would be too harsh. 6 This type of discriminatory enforcement is not merely
a violation of due process, but raises Fifth Amendment concerns as wel. 7
The proposed California legislation leaves open many questions whose
answers witnesses must guess at in determining whether they must make a
report to police. This lack of fair notice is in direct violation of procedural
due process. The vagueness creates windows for arbitrary enforcement by
allowing peace officers and courts to interpret each case according to their
own beliefs and attitudes. The potential is for arbitrary enforcement of the
statute to compel witnesses to testify at trials or punish witnesses the court
finds morally repugnant.
B. The First Amendment
Vagueness becomes even more important in a First Amendment con-
text."8 The right to free speech is one that is very closely guarded by our
84. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357-58; Parker, 417 U.S. at 752.
85. See Yeager, supra note 47, at 32-33. The potential for this type of discriminatory en-
forcement is particularly great in light of the fact that the proposed legislation was created in
response to the inaction of David Cash, an individual who may have been involved in the
murder of Sherrice Iverson. See Zamichow, supra note 18 and text accompanying note 36.
86. See Zamichow, supra note 18 and text accompanying note 36.
87. The Fifth Amendment protects individuals from self-incrimination. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V. Prosecuting an individual under a duty to report statute for failure to report a crime
in which that person is involved is in clear violation of the right against self-incrimination.
See Yeager, supra note 47, at 34.
88. See Parker, 417 U.S. at 752 ("where a state's literal scope.. .is capable of reaching
expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the (vagueness) doctrine demands a greater de-
1999]
11
Vance: My Brother's Keeper? The Criminalization of Nonfeasance: A Consti
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
courts.89 The potential for arbitrary enforcement is frightening when the law
regulates protected speech. The prospect of speaking (or not speaking) at
your peril is repugnant to the First Amendment."
The proposed legislation would compel those witnessing violent crimes
to report it to police. The reporting requirement, essentially, compels
speech.9' The law would make it a crime to remain silent. This ostensibly
stands in direct contradiction to the witness' constitutional right to free
speech. In order to justify such infringement, the state must demonstrate that
a sufficient state interest justifies the infringement on constitutionally pro-
tected speech.'
The state will likely assert its interest in protecting its citizens from vio-
lent crime, and its children from sexual assaults. The Supreme Court has al-
ready held the state has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens, par-
ticularly children.93
The state must next demonstrate that the law is narrowly tailored to
achieve this interest.94 A narrowly tailored law must be necessary to achieve
the compelling state interest.95 To be necessary, there must not be other
available methods of achieving the same governmental interest, which are
less intrusive on the constitution."
California already has several laws that are designed to protect children
from violent and sexual assaults. Specifically, California has a statute mak-
ing it a crime to sexually assault a child,97 and it imposes stiffer penalties on
the perpetrators of crimes against children." The state has the ability to go
after witnesses who aid in an assault or conceal it later by prosecuting them
as accessories." None of these laws involve compelled speech or constitu-
tional violations.
gree of specificity than in other contexts"); Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030,
1051 (1991), (prohibition against vague regulations on free speech is based on the risk of dis-
criminatory enforcement).
89. See id.
90. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 (1983).
91. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind
of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 573 (1995) (the right to free speech includes the right to refrain
from speaking, thus, the government cannot compel speech without violating the First
Amendment).
92. Free speech violations are subject to strict scrutiny by the court. See Wooley, 430
U.S. at 716-17.
93. See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
94. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716-17.
95. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716 ("even though the governmental purpose be legitimate
and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental per-
sonal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved").
96. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716-17 ("the breadth of legislative abridgment must be
viewed in light of less drastic means of achieving the same basic purpose").
97. See CAL PENAL CODE § 288 (West 1999).
98. See id.
99. See id. § 32.
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While the state does have in place some laws requiring affirmative du-
ties to report, they are readily distinguishable. California's Hit and Run stat-
ute requires individuals involved in auto accidents to remain on the scene
and report the accident. The purpose of the statute is to prevent drivers in-
volved in auto accidents from leaving the scene without identifying them-
selves or rendering aid to injured persons.' This statute is distinguishable
because the individuals who are compelled to report are directly involved in
the accident. A mere observer to an accident is not required to make a report,
just as an observer to a crime has never been required to report it.
In addition, the state can encourage voluntary reporting of crimes, with-
out making it a crime if you don't report one. Local police departments al-
ready work closely with many communities to form neighborhood watch
programs and encourage voluntary reporting." Further, positive incentives
such as monetary rewards and public recognition could be implemented to
encourage voluntary reporting. Public awareness campaigns have already
been instituted to educate the public on the importance of community in-
volvement in law enforcement 3 and the appropriate numbers to call during
an emergency. 4 These positive methods that encourage reporting may be far
more effective than criminal penalties for failing to report.
In fact, the failure to report statute is likely to be ineffective in meeting
its stated goals. Nevada prosecutors oppose duty to report statutes. They feel
that individuals who fail to report will be unwilling to come forward as wit-
nesses at a later date for fear of prosecution under the statute.'0 5
Further, in order for the citizens to be protected from these types of as-
saults by the reporting requirement, police would have to respond to the
emergency in time to stop the assault from proceeding any further. Police re-
sponse time in emergency situations varies widely from area to area. Major
metropolitan areas may require upwards of nine minutes for police to arrive
on the scene."° While nine minutes may seem relatively fast, absent some
100. See CALVEH. CODE § 20001 (West 1999).
101. See People v. Kuhn, 292 P.2d 964 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
102. See Neighborhood Watch Program, (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http://Aivw.max-
net.comfcommunity/dpd/ladner/neighbor.html> (describing one local neighborhood watch
program in which neighbors are encouraged to call police if they notice anything out of the
ordinary).
103. As a result of the McGruff® public service campaign, almost half of those seeing
the campaign reported feeling more personally responsible for preventing crime. See
Mcgruff® Background Information (visited Mar. 12, 1999) <http:/Avww.mcgruff-safe-
kids.con/cspopup.html>.
104. The Chicago Police Department instituted a "Make the Right Call" ad campaign to
encourage community policing. See Report Crime.. .But Make the Right Call (visited Feb. 23,
1999)<http://wwiv.ci.chi.il.us/CommunityPolicing/FoghtCrime/Report Crime.html>.
105. See Zamichow, supra note 18.
106. See Paul H.B. Shin, Cop Response Time Lags / Longer Than City Average, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 12, 1998, at 1 (police response times average 9.5 minutes city-wide); Jon
Yates, Study Finds Faster Police Responses, THE TENNEs SEAN, Mar. 18, 1998, at lB (Nash-
ville police average 9.03 to 8.67 minutes for life threatening calls).
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degree of torture, most violent felonies are completed long before the elapse
of nine minutes. In some cases, the police may take far longer to respond to
a call. 7
The response time may be exacerbated in the case of domestic vio-
lence.' 3 Many children who are victims of assault are victimized in their
own homes. Historically, police have been resistant to involvement in do-
mestic issues and "frequently ignored domestic violence calls or delayed re-
sponding for several hours."'"
Furthermore, police intervention does not always diffuse a violent situa-
tion. In some cases, police intervention may actually escalate the violence."
With little evidence that a reporting statute would actually help victims, the
state cannot justify infringing on the free speech rights of witnesses.
Another governmental interest is in capturing and punishing the crimi-
nals who engage in violent felonies. By compelling witnesses to report
crimes as soon as reasonably possible, authorities will be able to investigate
leads while they are still "hot." This would conceivably lead to more arrests
and convictions of violent felons. While the state does have an interest in
punishing the perpetrators of violence, it remains questionable whether that
interest is sufficiently strong enough to compel speech. Investigation of
criminal activity has always been balanced against the constitutional rights
of the public. For example, a police officer may not violate an individual's
Fourth Amendment rights by searching without probable cause in order to
arrest that individual."'
Here, the state seeks to violate an individual's First Amendment rights,
although the person is completely innocent of any crime. If one were guilty
or even merely suspected of a committing a crime, that person could not be
compelled to speak. Compelled speech would violate a suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights."' A criminal suspect has the right to remain silent, to
avoid self-incrimination. However, an innocent bystander must speak or face
criminal penalties. The fact that a person witnesses a violent act by chance,
should not be the basis for violating protected rights. Further, if an individual
does report, but fails to do so "as soon as reasonably possible" the reporting
107. See Fran Spielman, Alderman wants hearing on 911 response times, CHICAGO SUN
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1998, at 20 (police in Chicago took 45 minutes to respond to a call about a
young man beaten outside a woman's front door); Marybeth McFarland, Police Response
Time Appalls Woman: W. Rockhill Supervisor Defends Pennridge Force's Overall Job Per-
fornance, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Jan. 28, 1998, at B4 (police took 20 minutes to re-
spond to a man's call that someone had broken into his home).
108. See generally Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence,
1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46 (Spring, 1992).
109. Id. at 48.
110. See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology on Criminal Law: Evalu-
ating Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (Spring,
1992) (while arrest was helpful in some domestic violent cases, others were less successful,
with the violence escalating in retaliation for the arrest).
111. See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
112. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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itself would subject the individual to prosecution, and may violate that per-
son's right against self-incrimination.
When one is an innocent bystander to a violent assault, he may choose
to call the police and report it. Compelling a report is a direct contradiction
to the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. While the
state does have an interest in protecting victims of crimes and capturing the
perpetrators of violent crimes, there are alternative means available for
achieving those goals that are far less intrusive on free speech rights. The
proposed California legislation would fail this constitutional test because it is
not narrowly tailored to effectuate its purpose.
C. Privileges or Immunities
The failure to report a crime is an omission. The act itself does not spe-
cifically harm anyone. The doctrine of nonfeasance has traditionally granted
immunity from liability to bystanders."' Throughout our history citizens
have been immune from prosecution for omissions."' In the absence of some
legal duty to act, inaction has never been considered a punishable crime. The
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
States from passing laws, which infringe on the privileges or immunities of
its citizens." 5
However, this clause was essentially nullified in the Slaughter House
Cases and has yet to be resurrected by the Supreme Court."6 Instead, the
Court has classified fundamental rights and protections under the Due Proc-
ess Clause as "liberty interests."".7 Thus, nonfeasance should be classified as
a liberty interest under a substantive due process analysis.
D. Substantive Due Process
The due process clause protects those fundamental rights that are deeply
rooted in the Nation's history and traditions."8 The state is forbidden from
infringing on a fundamental right unless the infringement is narrowly tai-
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 315 (1993).
114. See Silver, supra note 39, at 425. "Preoccupation with affirmative acts and the de-
sire to limit judicial intervention evolved into the principle of not imposing liability for omis-
sions." Id.
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
116. See The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873) (holding privileges or immuni-
ties clause does not grant U.S. citizens broad protection against the actions of state govem-
ments) (no modem court has resurrected its powers).
117. The Court has recognized liberty interests in several fundamental rights under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (right to personal choice in matters of marriage and child bearing); Loving v.
Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (fundamental right to marry); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to choose an abortion in first trimester); Cruzan v. Director, Mis-
souri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (right to refuse medical treatment).
118. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
1999]
15
Vance: My Brother's Keeper? The Criminalization of Nonfeasance: A Consti
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1999
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
lored to serve a compelling state interest."9 The right to free speech is a fun-
damental right, rooted not only in our history and traditions, but also enu-
merated in the First Amendment of the Constitution.' 0
The due process clause also protects fundamental rights that are not spe-
cifically enumerated in the constitution but are so rooted in our history and
traditions that they are protected. 21 Duty to report statutes may also infringe
on our historically based fundamental right to privacy and personal auton-
omy.
The Court has recognized fundamental rights with respect to procrea-
tion, marital privacy, abortion and the right to die by natural causes.' The
general principle inherent in all of these decisions is an individual's right to
privacy and personal autonomy. "It is a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter."'"
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, the Court recognized a
liberty interest in an omission, the refusal of life sustaining medical treat-
ment. 4 The Court noted that this right was rooted in traditional common
law, which made it a battery to perform medical treatment without consent.'Y
Similarly, the right to refuse to act, when witnessing a crime, derives
from the common law doctrine of nonfeasance. One has never been obli-
gated to come to the aid of a stranger whom they did not put in danger.'26
There is a liberty interest in the freedom to make choices that do not cause
harm to others.
Personal autonomy and privacy include the right of an individual to go
about his business, so long as his actions do not create harm to others. Fail-
ure to report a crime is merely an omission. It is the private choice of an in-
dividual to go about his own business, without interfering in the lives of oth-
ers.
The liberty interest is strengthened by the fact that the compelled action
involves free speech. Where a state statute invades the personal sphere of
thoughts and beliefs of individuals in order to advance an ideological point
of view, it goes too far. 27 Here, the state is seeking to advance the ideologi-
cal view that all citizens should be morally obligated to intervene on the be-
119. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at721.
120. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
121. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
122. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (right to personal choice in matters of marriage and
child bearing); see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 1 (fundamental right to marry); Roe, 410 U.S. at
113 (right to choose an abortion in first trimester); Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261 (right to refuse
medical treatment).
123. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, 505 U.S. 833, 847
(1992).
124. 497 U.S. at 278.
125. See id. at 276-78.
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1993).
127. See Wooley v. Maynard 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977); Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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half of others when they witness a violent crime or an assault on a child. The
legislation would compel individuals who choose not to involve themselves
in the affairs of others to ignore their personal beliefs and contact authorities.
Compelled speech goes to the heart of personal liberty and autonomy. Thus,
there is a liberty interest in an individual's thoughts, words and actions.
This right is particularly strong in cases where, as in the Sherrice Iver-
son case, the victim is a complete stranger. While the law has always made
exceptions to the doctrine of nonfeasance with respect to special relation-
ships, the general rule is that one has no duty to come to the aid of anyone
with whom there is no special relationship. This doctrine distinguishes a
general duty to report from existing duties imposed on mental health profes-
sionals, doctors and education professionals, whose jobs entail specific re-
sponsibility for the health and well-being of children, and whose duty is lim-
ited to observations made in a professional capacity."
Once the Court determines that a fundamental right is being regulated,
the state must demonstrate both a compelling state interest, and that the stat-
ute is narrowly tailored to achieve that goal."9 Here, the state's interests are
in protecting victims and capturing perpetrators of violent crimes. As noted
above, these are valid interests. However, there are many laws and public
programs already in place to help achieve these interests that do not infringe
on fundamental rights. 3 ' In addition, the slow response time of police and
the possibility of increased violence when police intervene may significantly
reduce the validity of this interest.13 1 The statute also excludes those in privi-
leged relationships from having to report an assault on a child. Given most
assaults on children occur within the family, many of the likely witnesses
will be involved in a privileged relationship.
Thus, the California legislation fails on due process grounds. There is a
fundamental liberty interest in the right to go about one's business, so long
as an individual does not imperil others. The California statute infringes on
both the liberty interest of privacy and the fundamental right to freedom of
speech. It is not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's interest, and is likely
to be ineffective in achieving those goals. Thus, the proposed legislation
fails on substantive due process grounds.
E. Equal Protection Clause
The Equal Protection Clause affords protection so everyone will be
128. See CAL. PENAL CODE§ 11166.5 (West 1998).
129. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,721 (1997).
130. There are already criminal sanctions for behavior that rises to the level of an acces-
sory and stiffer penalties for perpetrators of crimes against children. See supra notes 97-99. In
addition there are many programs designed to encourage voluntary reporting including public
service campaigns and neighborhood watch programs. See supra notes 102-04.
131. See supra notes 106-110.
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treated equally under the law.' The Supreme Court has stated that "all simi-
larly situated individuals.., be treated alike."'33 A state must justify any law
that is not uniformly applied. Where a fundamental right is at issue, a statute
violating the Equal Protection Clause must demonstrate that it is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest."34
The proposed California legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause
because it treats individuals in privileged relationships differently from those
not in privileged relationships. The legislation specifically excludes those in
privileged relationships from having to report an assault.'35 Those who are
not in privileged relationships would have to fulfill the requirements of the
statute. Thus, a woman who is married may watch her husband assault a
child and fail to report it without fear of criminal prosecution. Conversely, a
similarly situated woman who lives with her boyfriend, without a formal
marriage, must report the assault of a child by her boyfriend. This is viola-
tive of Equal Protection, because as noted above, the state is infringing upon
a fundamental right.'36 Married people will not be prosecuted under the law if
they fail to report the crimes of their spouse. Meanwhile, unmarried indi-
viduals will face criminal penalties for the exact same behavior.
As noted above, the duty to report legislation regulates a fundamental
right. One has the right to decide whether or not to intervene in the affairs of
others, as well as the right to freedom of speech, which includes the right not
to be compelled to speak. As such, the state must demonstrate that the legis-
lation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. The legis-
lation is not narrowly tailored. There are other laws and programs already in
place, which help achieve the state's interests.'37 Further, the legislation
would likely do little to effectively meet its goals.' The legislation may
even prevent witnesses from coming forward at a later date.'39
The proposed duty to report law violates Equal Protection, as it does not
treat similarly situated individuals equally. The state has valid interests in
protecting its citizens, particularly children, from violent and sexual assaults,
and in capturing the perpetrators of violent crimes. The proposed statute is
not narrowly tailored to meet these objectives. Other, less intrusive means of
132. See U.S. CONsT. amend. 14, § 1.
133. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
134. See id. at440.
135. See AB 37, Assembly (1998).
136. Where a fundamental right is at issue, the equal protection violation is subject to
strict scrutiny. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. However, if no fundamental right is at issue,
the law is subject to the rational basis test. See id. The equal protection problem would proba-
bly be constitutional in the absence of a fundamental right, as the distinction between privi-
leged and unprivileged relationships has been upheld in evidentiary issues. See generally Cae-
sar v. Mountanos, 542 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1976).
137. See supra text accompanying note 130.
138. See supra notes 106-110.
139. See Zamichow, supra note 18, at Al (Nevada prosecutors fear that a duty to report
statute may prevent witnesses from coming forward later, for fear of prosecution).
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accomplishing the goals are already available and the legislation itself is
likely to be ineffective. The California statute violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution as it discriminates between privileged and un-
privileged relationships and is not narrowly tailored to achieve its stated
goals.
IV. APPLICATION OF CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSED STATUTE To CASH
California's proposed statute was drafted specifically to address the
Sherrice Iverson Murder and subsequent public outrage that David Cash was
not charged with any crime.4 ' Assuming that California's statute was in ef-
fect at the time of the murder, and that California had jurisdiction to prose-
cute Cash, it is unlikely that the public would have been satisfied with the
result.
In order for the duty to be applied, the proposed legislation requires that
an individual reasonably believes he has witnessed a violent felony, sexual
assault on a child, or any assault on a child likely to result in serious bodily
injury.' Cash maintains he did not witness the child being sexually as-
saulted and he did not feel she was in danger.'42 He left because he did not
want to know what was going to happen, but he did not believe his friend
would hurt the child.
43
The state must establish that Cash believed that he was witnessing one
of the listed crimes. Although friends of Cash have come forward to say that
Cash admitted to watching Strohmeyer assault the girl,"4 Cash continues to
maintain that he did not know a crime was going to occur.45 He left the rest-
room within two minutes of entering it, 46 evidence which may bolster his
case.
There is still a question of what Cash actually saw during that two-
minute time span. If he did not actually witness any crime, surely he sus-
pected his friend was acting inappropriately for the twenty minutes he re-
mained in the restroom. The proposed statute does not seem to address sus-
pected criminal activity that is not actually witnessed. Cash may have
avoided the proposed legislation altogether by leaving the restroom before
the assault actually took place, even if he suspected that an attack would oc-
cur.
Even if convicted, the penalty hardly seems to be what an outraged citi-
zenry had in mind when it sought to create a law to address Cash's behavior.
140. See William Brand, Assemblyman Introduces Good Samaritan Bill: Inspired by
Murder of Girl in Stateline Casino, OAKLAND TRIBUNE, Dec. 9, 1998, at NEWS-1.
141. See AB 37, Assembly (1998).
142. See Dolan, supra note 28, at Al.
143. See id.
144. See Zamichow, supra note 18, at Al.
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The crime is a misdemeanor. The maximum penalty is a thousand-dollar fine
and/or six months in jail.47 Sherrice Iverson's mother has been very vocal
and supportive of a duty to report statute.' 48 Primarily, her intent was to see
people like Cash punished.149 She considers Cash to be equally responsible
for the death of her daughter.5 ' It is doubtful that a thousand-dollar fine is
what she had in mind when she said that Cash should be punished.
Finally, if a duty to report statute were in place, it is unlikely that it
would have had any effect on Cash's actions. A person who lacks the moral
fortitude to come to the aid of a helpless little girl when it would be easy for
him to do so, is hardly the type of person who would be concerned about the
legal consequences of his failure to do anything. The actual consequences of
Cash's inaction were the sexual assault and murder of a little girl. He does
not appear to be remorseful about the girl's murder.' If the death of a little
girl was not enough to spur Cash into action, a small fine would be little in-
centive for him to act.
CONCLUSION
There is no question that David Cash's failure to intervene on behalf of
a little girl was reprehensible. In fact, there is evidence that he may have
been an accessory,' but that prosecutors did not charge him with a crime to
secure his testimony against Strohmeyer. 3 Perhaps society's anger should
be channeled toward the prosecution for failing to build a case against Cash
under existing laws. In any case, the rush to legislate a moral "duty to re-
port" seems to create more problems than it solves.
As a society, we have always been willing to permit some infringements
on our rights in exchange for the personal security given to us by law en-
forcement. But it is foolish to let our outrage over the acts of one young man
chip away at our cherished constitutional rights. Until the State is able to
147. AB 37 does not prescribe a specific punishment, but merely states the crime is a
misdemeanor. Where no specific punishment is prescribed, every misdemeanor is punishable
by a maximum of six months in jail and/or a $1,000.00 fine. See CAL PENAL CODE § 19 (West
1998).
148. See generally Metro Desk, News in Brief: A Summary of Developments Across Los
Angeles County Official Business / Courts and Government Council Backs Stronger Good
Samaritan Law, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at B4 (Iverson's mother thanks lawmakers for
their efforts).
149. See Sixty Minutes, supra note 7 (Iverson's mother states that "Cash needs to be
locked up").
150. See id. (Iverson's mother states that Cash is a "murderer within" and "should be
charged with accessory to the murder").
151. Cash's lack of remorse has helped to fuel the public outrage. See Sixty Minutes, su-
pra note 7.
152. See Zamichow, supra note 18, at Al (there is evidence that Cash may have encour-
aged the assault and told other students to keep quiet about the surveillance video); Ashby,
supra note 35, at 1.
153. See Ashby, supra note 37, at 1.
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draft legislation that is fair, narrowly tailored and likely to actually address
the problem, we should not be willing to accept the prosecution of affirma-
tive duties for which we have traditionally been immune.
Prosecutions under the statute will do little to motivate those who are
inclined to walk away from their moral responsibilities. Further, those who
may be willing to report crimes can be effectively encouraged to do so
through positive community policing programs. The moral outrage over the
acts of one reprehensible human being should not be used as the catalyst for
chipping away at the rights of everyone else. Most people in Cash's situation
would have come to the aid of Sherrice Iverson. No law would have been
necessary to force them to do so.
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